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PGTS Humble BlogThread: Internet Freedom/Filtering |
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Gerry Patterson. The world's most humble blogger |
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The Rabbit-proof Internet Fence |
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Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2008 18:35:33 +1100One of the reasons your humble blogger renewed blogging, after a long silence, was the news that the newly elected Australian government intended to introduce mandatory Internet Filters. After a little bit of research, your humble blogger discovered that this was the policy of both major parties in the last election. Possibly a persuasive argument for voting for the Greens? |
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Note: This was one of several posts about The Great Internet Rabbit-proof Fence -- Click here to return to the Index page.
This government faces many challenges. Education infrastructure, Science and research and development in industry and the tertiary education sector, Communications (especially broadband), and the biggest challenge of all, Global Warming, are all serious issues. Add to this the challenge of the Global Financial Crisis, and they would appear to have their work cut out for them.
The issue of Internet Filters is not as simple as proponents of the idea would have us believe. It is ill-conceived policy on the run. The real cost of a (genuine) Internet Filter is going to be extreme, and it threatens to undermine the important policies regarding Broadband and education, and science. It could further hamper other policy initiatives by consuming valuable capital and resources. The Internet Filter lobbyists are mostly ill-informed about the Internet and almost all of them considerably under-estimate the complexity and cost of the project.
In a previous blog entry, your blogger declared his opposition to the scheme. Put simply the ohjections can be summarised as follows:
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ISPs do not have the authority to block content. Any legislation that gave them such authority would be cumbersome and problematic. The mechanism for regulating such authority would become bureaucratic, legalistic and expensive.
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There is no one universal code of morality in Australia. Just as one would expect in any reasonably large democracy, there is a wide variety of opinions and attitudes, especially in regard to sex and sexual morality. Different families may vary considerably in how permissive/restrictive they are about what their children may see, hear and or discuss. This will depend on the age, education, profession, ethnic origin and religion of various family members. It would be unlikely that we ever reach consensus on this. The only feasible "filter" would have to be tailored for the individual Internet account. In other words there can't be a one size fits all policy,
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IP and URL based filtering is prone to error. Some sites may be banned because one URL on a server was deemed offensive or "inappropriate". In the worst case hundreds of URLs might be effected because one URL was listed. There is also the possibility that a URL or an IP address might be listed by mistake. In the case of IP addresses, these are often re-used. A new (appropriate) content provider might inherit an address that had previously been listed,
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There would have to be a mechanism of review and appeal. Otherwise the system could be abused. The recent anti-terrorism laws are a classic example. As more information comes to light about the Haneef case, it becomes apparent that the AFP tried to use their authority to suppress reports of their own bungling and incompetence. Fortunately some media outlets were not intimidated. Hopefully resistance to Internet filtering will be equally as spirited. Without an effective system of appeal and oversight, a blacklist could rapidly degenerate into an autocracy. The most obvious abuse of such an autocracy would be the targeting of critics of filtering with filtering technology (more about this below).
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There is not much interest in filters. Although the idea of filtering as a general principle seems to enjoy popularity amongst parents, when it comes to specifics, there is less enthusiasm. To date, despite the fear-mongering and publicity, the uptake of voluntary filtering has not been significant. Internet Filters are currently available, on a voluntary basis, and these have been promoted by semi-official bodies. For example, the IIA (Internet Industry Association) offers a "Ladybird Seal Of Approval", for ISPs. According to the IIA, their seal is only awarded to ISPs who offer effective, user-friendly filtering. They say that they are subject to rigorous testing, although they don't give much in the way of technical details. There is a list of filters on their information page. I tried several of the links on this page. Many of the PC based links were broken or did not lead to the product advertised. The links for server based packages appeared more reliable, however almost all of them would only run on Microsoft Windows or were "complete boxed" solutions (Note: there still are quite a few non-Microsoft servers). I was able to find the products listed by searching with Google. Most of what I saw seemed unsatisfactory and quite lacking in technical details. It is difficult to find accurate data about the uptake of Internet Filtering so far in Australia. However, it does appear that there is not a great deal of interest amongst consumers for do-it-yourself filters. The most ardent proponents of Internet Filters appear to be wowsers, god-botherers and the computer illiterati.
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It's the thin edge of the wedge. Any move towards Internet censorship could be the thin edge of the wedge! This is not just civil libertarian alarmism. After XXX rated, terrorism related and maybe hate speech ... what next? Political opinions that the authorities don't agree with? Criticism of any kind? When poorly planned, hastily conceived censorship regimes are setup, the first casualties are often the critics of the regime. People who are opposed to Internet censorship could easily become the first political targets of the filters. As already stated (above), the Haneef case is a classic illustration of how bureaucracies when given additional powers will attempt to use those same powers to stifle evidence of abuse of those very same powers. ( Update: Since this was written, ACMA tried to block the Wikileaks whistleblower site).
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It will slow down the network. This is even admitted by some of the proponents. The degradation of network performance will be considerable, due to the additional bandwidth and processing requirements of a universal firewall. It will slow down Internet access considerably and reduce network reliability, especially during periods of peak demand.
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They won't tell us how it works! Despite the many claims about the famous ACMA list with 1300 entries on it, and its' efficacy at combating child pornography, we still can't seem to get access to any real technical details. Where is it? How is it maintained? How can I see if my site is on the list? How can I see if someone else's site is on the list? In fact how can I see if any site is on it? etc, etc. Where are the technical details?
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In Any Case, it probably won't work, Much of the above may be irrelevant. Because experience has shown that Internet Filtering doesn't work! Even when you throw a lot of money at it. And this brings us to the last important point.
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We can't afford it. As the world spirals down into the biggest economic downturn since the Great Depression, we need to examine the cost of all new proposals. The expense of the legislation, the installation, the maintenance, the cost of setting up and administering the necessary additional checks and balances will all be passed along to taxpayers, consumers and end-users. In addition to this is the cost of network degradation, a cost we can ill afford and one which will detract from the government's effort to roll out a National Broadband Network.
As with the ill-conceived Rabbit-proof fence constructed last century to keep vermin out, or "The Great Wall Of China", designed to keep barbarians out, this attempt to clean up the Internet is doomed to fail. The most worrying aspect about this flawed project is the cost that will by borne mainly by Australian taxpayers and consumers and the counter-productive side-effects for our computing infrastructure and education. Most galling of all will be the almost certain failure of the project, the false sense of security that will been promoted during the initial roll-out, and the ultimate realisation that all the cost will have been for nothing.